The increasing prevalence of technology in modern airliners brings not just advantages, but also the potential for cyber threats. Fortunately, there have been no significant attacks on civil aircraft to date, which allows the handling of these emerging threats to be approached proactively. Although an ample body of research into technical defense strategies exists, current research neglects to take the human operator into account. In this study, we present an exploratory experiment focusing on pilots confronted with a cyber-attack. Results show that the occurrence of an attack affects all dependent variables: pilots' workload, trust, eye-movements, and behavior. Pilots experiencing an attack report heavier workload and weakened trust in the system than pilots whose aircraft is not under attack. Further, pilots who experienced an attack monitored basic flying instruments less and their performance deteriorated. A warning about a potential attack seems to moderate several of those effects. Our analysis prompts us to recommend incorporating cyber-awareness into pilots' recurrent training; we also argue that one has to consider all affected personnel when designing such training. Future research should target the development of appropriate procedures and training techniques to prepare pilots to correctly identify and respond to cyber-attacks.
Introduction
The exponentially increasing incidence of cyber-attacks is a growing problem in various private and public domains (Wilshusen, 2013) . These range from personal cell phones and computers to critical infrastructures-including that of civil aviation (Elias, 2015; Zan, d'Amore and Di Camillo, 2016) . A cyber-attack implies deliberate actions "to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary computer systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks" (Owens et al., 2009, p. S-1) . In aviation, the use of complex computer information technology such as that for fly-by-wire or flight management systems has intensified in recent decades. This trend has created potential vectors for cyber-attacks (Sampigethaya and Poovendran, 2013) . The interdependence between complex aircraft systems and their integration into a modern airliner can easily propagate the effects of a cyber-attack from one system to another (Haass et al., 2016) . Vereinigung Cockpit (2017) gave an overview of how interlinked the different systems in the aviation domain are, and where possible attack vectors might exist (see Fig. 1 ).
Several national and international aviation agencies (e.g., American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2013; European Aviation Safety Agency, 2016; Iasiello, 2014; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2012 , 2016 International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations, 2013; Lim, 2014) have already acknowledged that the civil aviation domain is potentially subject to cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks against aircraft are still extremely rare at the time of writing; however, their increasing incidence in the future is highly probable and may lead to catastrophes, especially given the current rate of development in information technologies (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2016) . Fox (2016) points out that although nothing serious has happened so far, it is a question of when rather than if. The vulnerability of commercial aircraft systems was highlighted by the U.S Department of Homeland Security, which was able to penetrate a commercial aircraft via radio frequency communication in 2016 (Biesecker, 2017 . The airline industry as well as regulators take this problem very seriously and are following different approaches (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2013; Iasiello, 2014) and also amended regulations (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013; 2014) , 2017a,b) . Firesmith (2003, p.14) defines security as "the degree to which malicious harm to a valuable asset is prevented, detected, and reacted to." Security is often seen as a technical challenge, although a successful cyber breach could evoke pilot reactions resembling those to a safety problem. However, from a human factors perspective, we think that pilots perceive differences between a cyber-breach-induced malfunction and a purely technical one. We point out these differences in the next section.
A human factors approach to cyber-attacks
Unfortunately, researchers have neglected human operators' response behavior in earlier cyber security research (Mancuso et al., 2014; Proctor and Chen, 2015) . Horowitz and Lucero (2016) and Heiges et al. (2015) used a scenario with a manipulated navigation system showing false waypoints. Their main interest, however, was in investigating which security requirements would be usefully satisfied in engineering tools. Human factors analysis showed pilots' explicit wish for technical support during a cyber-attack as well as their concern about making ill-informed decisions. The major issue is that a successful attack exposes pilots to great uncertainty (Dutt et al., 2013; Hirshfield et al., 2015) . Although individual cues might be ambiguous during the very infrequent occasions when technical malfunctions occur, pilots can normally apply procedures to solve the associated technical problems. Faced with a purely technical problem, pilots can also anticipate not only their own course of action but also the aircraft's behavior when, for example, a hydraulic system is leaking. The pilots know that they will receive an alert that hydraulic pressure is too low, maybe followed by another alert that the fluid level is also too low. Further, the pilots (depending on the aircraft type) might receive information from the aircraft system about how the specific technical malfunction will affect the aircraft's performance. In the example of a hydraulic system burst, the pilots can anticipate how this malfunction will affect their future flight-that their high-lift system will move slower, for instance-so that they can prepare mentally. When pilots face a cyber-attack, in contrast, they do not know whether the cues are trustworthy, or clear cues that an aircraft-borne system is under a cyber-attack might be absent. The pilots know neither whether the problem is solvable with their checklists and procedures, nor whether they will experience another problem right afterward. If pilots automatically follow their procedures in such cases, one can imagine potential attackers exploiting that knowledge to manipulate the pilots' behavior. Handling cyber-attacks, which are likely characterized by ambiguous cues lacking clear response options, becomes very effortful and also difficult for the pilots. The cue-clarity model that Orasanu et al. (1993) developed helps to understand how cue-clarity and response option availability can affect pilots' decision-making and performance.
An issue of cue-clarity
Cue-clarity describes a cue's clearness or ambiguity. An example for a clear cue could be a 'green hydraulic low pressure' warning in the abovementioned loss of a hydraulic system, while an ambiguous cue could be something like 'expect weather changes on-route'. Indeed, Dismukes et al. (2007) argue that weather information displays P. Gontar et al. Journal of Air Transport Management 69 (2018) 26-37 
